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The energy system and the economy are inextricably intertwined. While this interdependence is, of 
course, widely recognised, it has not featured prominently in assessing the likely impact of economic 
policies. In principle, broad fiscal policies are likely to have a significant influence on key elements of 
the energy system, the neglect of which may lead to inefficiencies in the design of appropriate energy 
and economic policies. The importance of this in practice depends on the strength of the spillover 
effects from fiscal policy instruments to energy policy goals. This is the focus of this paper. We employ 
a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach for the UK which allows us to track the 
impact of key fiscal policy interventions on key goals of economic and energy policies. Overall, our 
results suggest that a double dividend - a simultaneous stimulus to the economy and a reduction in 
emissions  induced by an increase in current public spending or a hike in the income tax rate seem 
unlikely in the UK context. Nonetheless, there are undoubted differential spillover effects on key 
components of the energy system from tax and public spending interventions that may prove capable 
of being exploited through the coordination of fiscal and energy policies. Even if it seems doubtful that 
fiscal policies would be formulated with a view to improved coordination with energy policies, 
policymakers should at least be aware of likely direction and scale of fiscal spillover effects to the energy 
system. 
 
This research was undertaken by the Fraser of Allander Institute & the Centre for 
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Research Centre, supported by the UK Research Councils under EPSRC award EP/L024756/1.  
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The energy system and the economy are inextricably intertwined. The experience of the great 
recession, for example, provides dramatic evidence of this: total UK energy consumption fell by over 
6% between 2008 and 2009 when the UK economy contracted by around 4% (BEIS, 2017). However, 
these spillovers are not necessarily negative, and double dividends (or even multiple benefits) are 
possible, where policies simultaneously stimulate economic activity and reduce emissions (and 
potentially also contribute to other policy goals). While this interdependence is, of course, widely 
recognised, it has not featured prominently in assessing the likely impact of economic policies, notably 
industrial and fiscal policies: rather they have tended to focus on the primary economic objectives of 
these policies, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. 
In principle, fiscal policies are likely to have a significant influence on the energy system, the neglect of 
which may lead to inefficiencies in the design of appropriate energy and economic policies. The 
importance of this in practice depends on the strength of the spillover effects from fiscal policy 
instruments to energy policy goals. This is the focus of the present paper. 
It has been suggested that the impacts of economic policies on the energy system have not been 
extensively researched. This perceived lack of systematic analysis is highlighted in a recent literature 
review by Cox et al. (2016). However, in the context of the energy-economy-environment modelling 
literature there has in fact been widespread recognition of the impact of the economy and economic 
policies on energy use, even if the primary emphasis has tended to be on the effects of energy and 
environmental policies. For example, there are studies suggesting that fiscal policies (primarily focused 
on government spending) are an important determinant of environmental pollution (see e.g. Halkos & 
Paizanos, 2013,2016; Gupta & Barman, 2009; and Lopez et al., 2011). Moreover, there is a considerable 
body of research assessing the (economy-wide) implications of taxation directed at fuel consumption 
(e.g. Zhang et al., 2016 for a recent review of research on carbon tax). A further example of the 
literature is on the Environmental Kuznets Curve, which posits that rising prosperity will ultimately be 
accompanied by falling pollution, following an earlier period in which growth is accompanied by 
increasing pollution (see, e.g. Grossman and Kreuger, 1994; Jaffe et al., 2003; Vollebergh et al., 2009 
and Cui et al., 2017). 
The multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach which we employ here captures the 
interdependence of the economy and key elements of the energy systems and allows us to track the 
impact of key fiscal policy interventions on key goals of economic and energy policies. While there is a 
huge literature on energy-economy-environment CGE modelling (e.g. Bergman, 2005; McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 2013) and many example of CGE analyses of fiscal issues (e.g.HolmØy and StrØm, 2013), there 
are few examples combining these analyses. Our approach allows us ultimately to develop a more 
holistic perspective on the implications of policy actions. In particular, our intention is ultimately to 
create a framework that explicitly recognises, and seeks to quantify, the scale of spillovers from 
economic and energy policies to energy and economic policy goals respectively. Where these spillovers 
prove to be significant, accounting for them through better coordination of economic policies with 
energy policies would create the potential to deliver improved outcomes for both. 
This paper continues recent work on the spillover effects between economic and key components of 
the energy systems using a CGE framework for the UK. Ross et al. (2018a,b,c) analyse the potential 
impacts of successful UK industrial, business and innovation policy on the UK economic and energy 
systems, as well as the corresponding energy policy goals. Ross et al. (2018a,b) analyse the system-wide 
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effects of successful export strategies on economic and energy policy, and Ross et al. (2018c) consider 
the likely impacts of increased labour productivity on the economy, the energy system, and energy 
policy goals. In this paper we focus on the energy consequences of fiscal policy changes in the UK. 
Our primary focus in this paper is on the impacts of fiscal policies on key elements of the energy system 
and their effects on energy policy goals such as energy use and carbon emissions, energy intensity and 
energy security. We start by considering the impacts on elements of the energy system of an increase 
in government spending in isolation, and then explore in more detail the impact of an increase in the 
average income tax rate. We then proceed by considering the implications of a balanced-budget rise in 
the income tax rate, where additional tax revenues are matched by a rise in government spending. 
Since we wish to focus on the direct linkages between fiscal policy instruments and the energy system 
we adopt a number of straightforward macroeconomic closures (which we shall relax in future work). 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines an ex-ante macroeconomic labour market analysis 
of increases in government expenditure and taxation, separately and in a balanced-budget 
context. Sections 3 and 4 outline the structure of our energy-economy-environment model of the UK 
economy, paying particular attention to the linkages between the economy and energy components of 
the model, and the simulation strategy. We present results in Section 5, and a summary of main 
conclusions in Section 6. 
 -
 
 
In this section we provide some analytical insight into the factors underlying the impact of the various 
fiscal policies that we model. We focus on the labour market to highlight the implications of alternative 
perspectives on wage determination, which proves significant for outcomes for both the economy and 
key elements of the energy system. Whilst our underlying assumptions are UK specific, the labour 
market analysis is likely to have wider applicability. For simplicity, we assume that the change in fiscal 
policy is insufficient to generate a reaction from the Bank of Englands Monetary Policy Committee, so 
that no financial crowding out occurs.1 Throughout we assume, again for simplicity, that government 
expenditure is current spending that has no immediate impact on the supply side of the economy.2  
 
 
 
Consider first the case of an increase in government spending  and assume that the change is bong-
financed. Figure 1 represents the long-run interactions of the general equilibrium labour demand and 
supply curves in the UK labour market. The analysis is comparative static in that it can be used to 
illustrate the impact on the real wage and employment, of the increase in government spending. 
Exports dont change where there are no changes in prices. In the long run, investment is replacement 
investment (covering depreciation only) and is therefore driven by absolute level of activity, sectoral 
composition, and sectoral capital intensities. 
                                                          
1 In effect, it is as if the UK is operating in a liquidity trap. 
2 Clearly some expenditure classified as current would be expected to have supply side effects e.g. spending on education 
provision via its impact on human capital. We return to this in due course. 
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In Figure 1, the demand for labour is a general equilibrium relationship, which incorporates the entire 
system-wide consequences of a change in the real wage. There is a strong presumption that the curve 
has a negative slope in employment-real wage space, though this is not necessarily the case because 
as the real wage rises so too does labour income and demand. However, for the default parameter 
values of our CGE model (described in Section 3) the negative competitiveness effects of an increase in 
the real wage, which dampens exports and encourages imports, dominates the positive income 
effects.3 
The initial equilibrium is represented in Figure 1 by the intersection of the labour demand curve, D0, 
and wage setting/labour supply curves, at point A, generating the initial equilibrium employment and 
real wage levels rw0, and E0. The increase in government spending shifts the general equilibrium 
demand curve for labour to the right, indicating that more labour is demanded at each real wage. The 
labour demand curve shifts from Do to DLR in the long run.4 Alternative visions of the effective supply 
of labour or wage setting mechanism are crucial to determining the impact of this stimulus on the 
economy. We show a number of alternative approaches in Figure 1. Their operation is outlined in 
greater detail in Section 3.3 and they are employed as alternative labour market closures in the 
simulations reported in Section 5.  
Our default CGE model specification embodies a wage curve which is an inverse relationship between 
the rate of unemployment and the real wage. Wage curves are typically thought to reflect the outcome 
of a wage bargaining procedure, with the workers bargaining power increasing as the level of 
unemployment falls.5 As outlined in Ross et al. (2018a) in greater detail, there is substantial 
international evidence in support for such a model specification. Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), for 
example, provide a review of recent research on wage curves found across a range of countries. In the 
employment-real wage space of Figure 1, the wage curve, or bargained real wage function (BRW), is 
illustrated with an upward sloping curve, reflecting the negative relationship between the 
unemployment and employment rates.  
Under our default assumption and benchmark BRW case, workers are able to bargain for higher wages 
as the labour market tightens. At the initial equilibrium, an excess demand for labour is created and the 
increased bargaining power of workers exerts upward pressure on the real wage. This leads to a degree 
of crowding out through the induced loss in competitiveness. The new long-run equilibrium is 
established at point B, where both and employment and the real wage increase to E1 and rw1 
respectively. Since economic activity is stimulated so too, in general, is the demand for energy used in 
both production (intermediates) and final demand.6 
While, as we have noted, there is compelling international evidence in favour of our default wage curve 
specification, we consider a number of different labour market closures, so as to reflect alternative 
visions of how the UK labour market operates. We do this for two main reasons. First, there exists 
genuine uncertainty about the way that the aggregate UK labour market currently operates and there 
has been considerable controversy surrounding the issue (e.g. Bell & Blanchflower, 2018). Secondly, we 
wish to check the extent to which spillovers from economic policies to elements of the energy system 
vary with alternative visions of UK labour market behaviour. This allows us, as far as is practical within 
                                                          
3 This is what we would expect for a comparatively small (as a proportion of total world trade), open economy like the UK. 
4 We focus here on the long run. In the short run, where sectoral capital stocks are fixed, the rightward shift is limited. 
However, this tends to push up capital rates, spurring sectors to invest in capital, and leads to increased capacity and a 
greater demand for labour in the long run. 
5 An efficiency wage explanation is also available. 
6 In the context of a multi-sectoral model the link is not inevitable given the importance of changes in the composition of 
economic activity as well as its level. 
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our CGE model, to check that our conclusions are robust with respect to the choice of any particular 
model of the UK labour market.  
One alternative vision of the labour market is that it is characterised by excess capacity over a range, 
so that any changes in labour demand can be met by a corresponding change in the level of 
employment, but at a fixed real wage (FRW). Such a case could also be motivated in terms of the 
presence of real wage resistance: workers seek to maintain the real value of their take home pay (in 
this case we do not make a distinction between pre- and post-tax pay as taxes remain unchanged), 
regardless of the nature of any macroeconomic demand disturbance.7 In this case, the effective labour 
supply curve is horizontal through point A (over the relevant range), and employment adjusts in 
response to labour demand through changes in the unemployment and participation rates.8 Essentially, 
only quantities change since prices are invariant across long-run equilibria, with the new equilibrium at 
point C in Figure 1, and there is no crowding out of economic activity. The real wage is, of course, 
unchanged, but employment increases significantly to E2.  
We also consider the case where the nominal wage is fixed. Under present assumptions the fixed 
nominal wage (FNW) case generates the same results as the FRW case in the long run, since prices (and 
real and nominal wages) do not change across such equilibria. This corresponds to the simple Keynesian 
multiplier case, and the multi-sectoral results emulate the behaviour of an extended Input-Output 
system with entirely passive supply side in the long run9. Since the stimulus to economic activity is 
greater in this case than for BRW, we expect the use of energy to be greater too, both in production 
and in final demands. 
A further alternative perspective on the labour market, often adopted in national CGE models, is of 
continuous full-employment with an exogenous labour supply (ELS) curve and fixed participation rate 
(see e.g. Partridge and Rickman (2010) for a brief discussion). In this closure, employment is effectively 
fixed and is represented by the vertical ELS curve through point A in Figure 1. Following the demand 
stimulus, a new long-run equilibrium is established where the real wage rises to rw2: in effect, the real 
wage rises until it dampens the stimulus to demand entirely at point D. In this case there is complete 
crowding out in terms of employment, which remains fixed at E0. In a multi-sectoral context, GDP may 
change as resources are reallocated across sectors in response to the demand stimulus and significant 
upward pressure on real wages, but the direction will depend on sectoral export, labour and 
intermediate intensities and key elasticities. However, if GDP increases, it is likely to be a much more 
modest change than is associated with either the BRW or FRW variant. Accordingly, we would expect 
any stimulus to energy use in production and final demands to be less than in the other cases. 
In general, we would expect total energy use  in both production and final demand  to increase 
broadly with the level of economic activity, and so the energy impacts will be ranked similarly to the 
likely employment (and GDP) impacts. However, there is an important compositional effect here: UK 
public spending tends to be significantly less energy and emissions intensive than private expenditures 
such as consumption and investment. So in the presence of complete crowding out (under ELS), the 
increase in government expenditure will lead to an inevitable fall in emissions. In the absence of any 
                                                          
7 Because with a simple increase in government expenditure the tax rate remains unchanged, there is no distinction 
between holding the real pre-tax and post-tax wage constant. In simulations where the rate of income tax changes, this 
distinction gains in salience.  
8 In general, net in-migration could generate such a response without incurring any capacity constraint. 
9 Input-Output is a general equilibrium system with fixed coefficient technologies, an absence of capacity constraints and an 
infinitely elastic supply of labour. McGregor et al. (1996) demonstrate that regional CGEs generate IO results in long-run 
equilibria given these assumptions. 
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crowding out (FRW) emissions must rise because government spending has increased and no element 
of private spending has fallen. In practice, whether total emissions rise or fall in response to an increase 
in government spending depends on its impact on private expenditures; certainly it is perfectly feasible 
for an expenditure-generated fiscal expansion to result in a decline in emissions and a simultaneous 
rise in economic activity. 
 
 
 
Next, consider the case of an increase in the income tax rate, Figure 2 represents the long-run 
interactions of the general equilibrium labour demand and supply curves in the UK labour market of an 
increase in the income tax rate (embodying the same initial conditions as described for Figure 1). This 
corresponds to the actions of a government wishing to reduce the fiscal debt through increased 
taxation. This corresponds to the actions of a government wishing to reduce the fiscal debt through 
increased taxation. 
The initial equilibrium is represented in Figure 2 by the intersection of the labour demand and supply 
curves, at point A, generating the initial equilibrium employment and real wage levels rw0, and E0. The 
increase in the income tax rate shifts the general equilibrium demand curve for labour to the left, 
indicating that less labour is demanded at each real wage. Here we see a contraction in aggregate 
demand since disposable incomes (and wealth) of households are reduced. The labour demand curve 
shifts from Do to DLR in the long run10.   As previously, alternative visions of the effective supply of labour 
are crucial to determining the impacts. 
The most straightforward case to consider here is that of the fixed pre-tax wage (Fixed Nominal Wage 
or Fixed Real (gross) Wage, which is equivalent here given no changes in prices or wages). In this case, 
the supply curve is effectively horizontal across long-run equilibria. The nominal and real wage remains 
fixed, so that there is no adverse supply impact arising from increased pressure on wages. However, 
employment falls, and the long-run equilibrium is at C. After-tax real wages do fall given the increase in 
tax and an unchanging gross real wage.  The result is very like an extended Keynesian or Input-Output 
(fix-price) multiplier analysis with endogenous investment. 
Under the BRW case, the impact is no longer a pure demand shock. As before, aggregate demand falls 
(as above, from Do to DLR). However, there is now an adverse supply shock since the BRW model 
assumes that workers bargain over the net-of-tax-wage (or take-home wage). The BRW curve thereby 
shifts upward from BRWo to BRW1 in the long run. The vertical upward shift, the distance AE, is exactly 
the rise in the gross real wage that is required to restore the post-tax real wage following the tax 
increase at the original level of employment. In general, we do not know the relative sizes of the 
demand and supply shifts, but Figure 2 assumes (in line with our simulation results) a predominant 
adverse supply shift so that the equilibrium level of the gross real wage rises to rw2. Of course, 
equilibrium employment falls, to E2. In this case the contraction is greater than under FRW. 
It is clear that in the regional bargaining case just analysed, workers fail to restore their post-tax real 
wage: rw2 lies below rw3. Suppose workers were to insist on the maintenance of their post-tax real 
wage: this post-tax variant of real wage resistance would imply a shift in the fixed real wage curve 
from FRW to FRWpt. The result would be a major fall in employment to E3. In the ELS case the supply 
                                                          
10 Again, we focus here solely on the long run. 
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curve remains unchanged but here even gross real wages fall, so that the long run equilibrium is at B, 
where employment is, of course, unchanged at E0. 
The adverse demand shock impacts directly on household disposable income and wealth, and hence 
consumption, and will have knock-on effects to investment and exports. The adverse supply shock (in 
the BRW case) induces a reduction in production which has further negative impacts on demand as 
wages and prices rise. As previously, we would expect total energy use  in both production and final 
demand  to fall with the level of economic activity, and so the energy impacts will be ranked similarly 
to the likely employment (and GDP) impacts. Notice that here we expect quite a close linkage between 
the change in economic activity generated by a tax rise and energy use and emissions. This contrasts 
markedly with the case of UK government spending given its comparatively low energy and emissions 
intensity. 
While we have conducted the analysis for the case of an increase in the average income tax rate, it is 
easily extended to the (opposite) case of a tax fall. Here an induced expansion in the economy would 
operate through its stimulus to (energy and emissions intensive) private sector economic activity. 
 
-  
 
Here we analyse the case of a balanced-budget fiscal expansion, where the income tax rate is raised, 
but, in contrast to the previous case, income tax revenues are recycled to stimulate current government 
expenditure. Since UK government spending is less import intensive than consumption, the substitution 
of the former for the latter results in a net expansion in demand, again in contrast to the analysis of a 
simple tax rise. However, there is also an adverse impact on the supply side if workers bargain for post-
tax real wages. In general, we do not know a priori which pressure will dominate (when both are 
applicable), but Figure 3 is drawn on the assumption that, when present, adverse supply impacts 
dominate (with a resultant contraction in employment). 
The supply side shifts are similar to those discussed in the context of Figure 2, but here DLR shifts out 
and to the right of D0. With a fixed gross real wage there is no adverse supply effect so that the 
expansionary demand effect results in a new equilibrium at point B, with employment increasing to E1. 
We know that under regional bargaining, the BRW curve shifts up to BRW1, which would restore the 
post-tax real wage at F. Given a predominant adverse supply effect, the new equilibrium is established 
at a point like E, with lower employment of E3. Of course, at E the pre-tax real wage rises to rw3, but is 
still associated with a fall in the post-tax real wage (rw4). If workers manage to restore their post-tax 
real wage, the FRW curve shifts vertically up to FRWpt and passes through point F, ensuring a major 
contraction in employment. Under ELS the stimulus to demand ultimately raises the pre-tax real wage 
to the point where it chokes off the additional demand for labour at point D.  
Here we include an additional labour market closure, the Social Wage case, which essentially reflects a 
situation where workers attribute the same value, at the margin, to the consumption of public and 
private goods (outlined in more detail in Section 4.3). The intuition is that workers may be willing to 
accept a cut in their post-tax wage given that there is an increase in government spending: their social 
wage is unaffected, so they do not press for higher wages to compensate for the tax rise. In this case 
bargaining is effectively over the pre-tax wage and the balanced budget fiscal contraction has no impact 
on BRW0. Accordingly, this case is also associated with an expansion in employment to E2, although this 
does allow workers to bargain for a higher (pre-tax) real wage (rw1). 
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The potential impacts on the  energy use and demands is the net-effect of the increase in government 
expenditure and the hike in the income tax rate. As previously, we would expect total energy use  in 
both production and final demand  to fall with the level of economic activity, and so the energy impacts 
will be ranked similarly to the likely employment (and GDP) impacts.  
 
 The (long run) system-wide labour market impact of an increase in government spending. 
 
 
 
 The (long run) system-wide labour market impact of an increase in the income tax rate. 
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: The (long run) system-wide labour market impact of a balanced budget increase in the income 
tax rate. 
 
 
 
  
 
We simulate the impacts of illustrative fiscal policies (see Section 5 for more details on the simulation 
strategy) using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK, UK-ENVI. The UK-ENVI model 
was purpose built to capture the interdependence of the energy and non-energy sub-systems. Versions 
of this model have been employed, for example, to analyse the impacts of increased efficiency in the 
industrial use of energy (Allan et al., 2007), identify the impacts of energy efficiency programmes on 
households (Figus et al., 2017), and to identify total energy rebound effects of improvements in 
household energy efficiency (Lecca et al., 2014a). In the following sections we provide a brief 
description of the main characteristics of the model, with a particular emphasis on the linkages between 
the economic and energy sub-sectors.11 
  
We model the consumption decision of five representative households h as follows: 
  h h h h hC YNG SAV HTAX CTAX     (1) 
where total consumption C is a function of income YNG, savings SAV, income taxes HTAX, and taxes on 
consumption CTAX. 
Consumption is modelled to reflect the behaviour of a representative household that maximises its 
discounted intertemporal utility, subject to a lifetime wealth constraint. The solution of the household 
                                                          
11 A full mathematical description of the model is given in Ross et al. (2018a). 
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optimisation problem gives the optimal time path for consumption of the bundle of goods C. To capture 
information about household energy consumption, consumption is allocated within each period and 
between energy goods and non-energy and transport goods and services (including fuel use in personal 
transportation) as indicated in the top level of the consumption structure shown in Figure 4. This choice 
is made in accordance with the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function: 
      1 11 1
h
h hh
h
h
E E
h h h h hC EC TNEC
H
H HH HHG G
 ª º  « »« »¬ ¼
 (2) 
ǁŚĞƌĞɸŝƐƚŚĞĞůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇŽĨƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ
substitute residential energy consumption, EC, for non-energy and transport consumption, TNEC, ɷ੣ 
(0,1) is the share parameter. For simplicity (and in the absence of better information), in all households 
ǁĞŝŵƉŽƐĞĂǀĂůƵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌɸ, which is the long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-
energy estimated by Lecca et al. (2014a). The consumption of residential energy includes electricity, 
gas and coal, as shown in Figure 4, although coal represents less than 0.01% of total household energy 
consumption. Within the energy bundle, given that we do not focus on inter-fuel substitution in the 
analysis below, we impose a small but positive elasticity of 0.2. 
Moreover, we assume that the individual can consume goods produced both domestically and 
imported, where imports are combined with domestic goods under the Armington assumption of 
imperfect substitution (Armington, 1969): 
  
1
  
A A A
i i if hir hm
i i i i i iQH QHIR QHMU U UJ G Gª º  ¬ ¼    (3) 
where QH is total household consumption by sectors, QHIR is consumption of locally produced goods, 
QHM is consumption of imported goods, and the i subscript represents the sector. With the price of 
imports being exogenous, substitution between imported and domestically produced goods depends 
on variations of national prices. 
 
: The structure of consumption 
 
 
It must be noted that the Armington assumption has implications for the decisions of both producers 
and consumers. The choice over imported or domestic inputs for firms depends on their relative prices, 
as well as the Armington elasticity. Similarly, consumers choose over imported and domestic goods 
depending on relative prices and the Armington elasticity. Intermediate purchases in each industry are 
modelled as the demand for a composite commodity with fixed (Leontief) coefficients (as outlined in 
the following section in more detail). These are substitutable for imported commodities via an 
Consumption 
ı=0.64
Residential 
energy
ı=0.64
Electricity Gas Coal
Transport and 
non-energy
ı=0.64
Transport Non-energy
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Armington link, which is sensitive to relative prices. Given the importance of the Armington elasticities 
to trade we identify the implications of different values of these elasticities in our sensitivity analysis. 
  
The production structure of each of the thirty production sectors is characterised by a capital, labour, 
energy and materials (KLEM) nested CES function. As we show in Figure 5, the combination of labour 
and capital forms value added, while energy and materials form intermediate inputs. In turn, the 
combination of intermediates and value added forms total output in each sector.  
 
: The structure of production 
 
In the long run, investment is equal to depreciation, and there is no difference in the desired and actual 
capital stocks. The desired capital stock is a function of commodity output, the nominal wage and the 
user cost of capital. Desired capital stocks are driven by cost-minimisation criteria, and actual stocks 
reflect last period's stocks, adjusted for depreciation and gross investment. 
  
As already outlined in Section 2, we consider a number of alternative labour market closures. Our 
default model specification embodies a wage curve which is an inverse relation between the rate of 
unemployment and the real wage. Wages are thereby determined within the UK in an imperfectly 
competitive context, according to the following bargained real wage (BRW) specification: 
  ln ln( )wb u
cpi
U Hª º  « »¬ ¼        where 1
w
wb W    (4) 
In equation 5, /t twb cpi  is the real take home wage, U is a parameter calibrated to the steady state, 
H is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment, tu , and tW  is the income tax rate. So 
here the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the rate of unemployment 
(Blanchflower & Oswald, 2005), which is an indicator of workers bargaining power.12 
The working population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous. This model implies the presence of 
involuntary unemployment (with BRW lying above the competitive supply curve for labour).  
                                                          
12 We also separately explore the consequences of a wage curve that has the pre-tax wage in the unemployment rate. 
Total output 
ı=0.3
Value added
ı=0.3
Capital Labour
Intermediate
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Energy Material
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Next, we consider a case where workers reflect the amenity of value of public expenditure in the wage-
bargaining process. This is implemented by augmenting equation 4 so that: 
  ln ln( ) ln(1 )wb u
cpi
U H DE Wª º    « »¬ ¼  (5) 
where (0,1)D   represents the extent to which public consumption is reflected in the wage 
determination; and (0,1)E   is relative valuation of public goods. When the two parameters equal 1, 
wage bargaining responds to the gross of tax wage. Essentially this reflects a situation where workers 
attribute the same value, at the margin, to the consumption of public and private goods. This implies 
that the amenity value of government expenditure is independent of its composition (Lecca et al., 
2014b). This is the social wage case (SOC)13. 
Conventional CGEs of national economies often make the simplifying assumption of an entirely 
exogenous labour supply (with both population and the participation rate invariant): that is labour 
supply exhibits a zero elasticity with respect to the real wage. This exogenous labour supply (ELS) 
specification of the labour market implies that employment is fixed. 
 Ls Ls   (6) 
Of course, this vision of the labour market implies that the UK operates under a very tight supply 
constraint. Aggregate GDP can only vary in response to disturbances that alter the allocation of activity 
across sectors. Furthermore, employment is effectively fixed even in the longer-term, and is, of course, 
invariant to any change in demand, although capital stocks can adjust in response to changes in rental 
rates.14  
Some take the view that workers in the UK bargain to maintain their real wage - real wage resistance 
- that results in a fixed real wage (FRW) pre / post-tax model. This model implies: 
 0
0
t t
t t
wb wbFRWpt
cpi cpi
 
 
    (7) 
 0
0
t t
t t
w wFRWpre
cpi cpi
 
 
    (8) 
This case effectively implies an infinitely elastic supply of labour over the relevant range. In stark 
contrast to the ELS case, here the real wage is fixed and any demand disturbances will be reflected only 
in employment changes (over a range).   
The ELS and FRW cases represent limiting cases of the responsiveness of the effective supply of labour 
to the real consumption wage, with elasticities of zero and infinity respectively. The BRW case 
represents an intermediate case in which the effective (bargaining-determined) level of employment 
varies positively with the real consumption wage. 
In the absence of changes in foreign prices, equation 8 can also be interpreted as a case of nominal 
wage inflexibility. This may be particularly important as recent experience casts some doubt on the 
                                                          
13 See Lecca et al. (2014) for more details. 
14 In the longer-term population and labour supply can, of course, increase through natural population growth. For simplicity 
we abstract from that here. Migration flows could also alter labour supply, but we assume that net migration is zero here. 
However, the fixed real wage model, discussed below, emulates many of the features of a system with endogenous (flow) 
migration. 
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current relevance of the BRW or FRW hypotheses, since real wages have been falling despite a fall in 
the unemployment rate. We illustrate the likely implications of this by exploring the limiting case of a 
fixed nominal wage (FNW). 
  
The Government in UK-ENVI collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of economic activities. 
The Government operates according to the following budget constraint where the government budget 
is given by government income minus expenditure: 
 T T TGGOV Y GBAL EXP         where tt g t t t tGY d KY IBT LY FEW      (9) 
where GOVBAL is the government budget which is equal to the difference between government income 
GY, and government spending GEXP. GY is given by the share dg of capital income KY that is transferred 
to the Government, Indirect business taxes, IBT, revenues from labour income LY at the rate W 15, and 
foreign remittance FE.  
In our simulations we make two alternative assumptions in which either GOVBAL or GEXP are fixed, 
denoted as FIXBAL and FIXGOV, respectively, and there is no change in the composition of government 
expenditure, so that: 
 T TTGGOV Y GBAL EXP    (10) 
or 
 TT TGOVBAL GY GEXP    (11) 
  
To calibrate the model, we follow a common procedure for dynamic CGE models which is to assume 
that the economy is initially in steady state equilibrium (Adams & Higgs, 1990). We calibrate the model 
using information from the UK Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2010.16  
The UK-ENVI model has 30 separate production sectors, including 6 main energy supply industries that 
encompass the supply of coal, refined oil, gas and electricity.17 We also identify the transactions of UK 
households (by income quintile), the UK Government, imports, exports and transfers to and from the 
rest of the World (ROW). 
The SAM constitutes the core dataset of the UK-ENVI model. However other parameter values are 
required to inform the model. These often specify technical or behavioural relationships, such as 
production and consumption function substitution and share parameters. Such parameters are either 
exogenously imposed, based on econometric estimation where available, or determined through the 
calibration process.  
                                                          
15 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵĞƚĂǆƌĂƚĞʏŝƐĨŝǆĞĚďǇĚĞĨĂƵůƚ ? 
16 Emonts-Holley et al. (2014) give a detailed description of the methods employed to construct these data. The SAM is 
produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and available for download at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
17 See Appendix A for the full list of sectors in the aggregate 30 sector 2010 UK SAM. 
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Base year industrial territorial CO2 emissions are calculated, and linked to the CGE sectoral primary fuel 
use according to Allan et al., (2018). This essentially converts ONS (2018a) data on sectoral physical use 
of energy to CO2 using UK emissions factors (UK Government, 2010). From this, a proportioned 
emission factor for each of the 3 primary fuels (coal, oil and gas) is calculated for each sector to obtain 
sectoral base year emissions18. To determine the emissions resulting from changes in the economy, 
simulations are run using the CGE model, which give the sectoral changes in the use of each of the 
primary fuels. With these changes, the new emissions are calculated.  
  
 
The simulations extend the ex-ante analysis of the previous section. In order to identify the likely impact 
of fiscal policies on the economy and the nature and scale of spillovers to energy policy goals, we 
proceed by exploring some simple simulations. 
First, we investigate the impact of a 5% increase in real Government expenditure alone, so as to focus 
on the effects of expenditure per se on the economy and key elements of the energy system. This simply 
constitutes a stimulus to demand. We assume that the change is bond-financed, but recall we assume 
that the interest rate is fixed (by monetary policy action or a liquidity trap). We use this simulation as a 
way of isolating the impacts of changes in public spending on energy demands and supplies. 
Next, we explore the impact of a 5% increase in the average rate of income tax rate in isolation. This 
corresponds to the actions of a government wishing to reduce the fiscal debt through increased 
taxation. This is associated with a negative demand shock (as take home pay and consumption are 
adversely affected) and, where bargaining is over a post-tax wage, an adverse supply shock (as workers 
seek to restore their post-tax wage). Again, the primary motivation is to identify the spillover effects to 
key elements of the energy system, although of course these depend critically on the economic impact 
of the tax rise. 
Finally, we analyse the consequences of an increase in the average income tax rate (of 5 percent) as in 
the previous case, but here we impose a balanced budget; the increment to income tax revenues is 
used to fund an increase in current government expenditure. We know that in this final case there is a 
combination of a positive demand and a negative supply side shock. With the balanced budget 
simulation we also undertake sensitivity analysis to identify the extent to which the results vary with 
some key demand elasticities. 
  
 
In the following sections we outline the simulation results for the increase in government spending, the 
increase in the income tax rate, and where the income tax rate is increased under a balanced budget 
assumption. 
The economy is taken to be in long-run equilibrium prior to the shock (i.e. the increase in government 
spending / hike in the income tax rate), so that when the model is run forward in the absence of any 
disturbance it simply replicates the base year dataset (the 2010 SAM) in each period. The results 
                                                          
18 This figure compares well with data on UK territorial and resident based CO2 emissions from the ONS (2018b) 
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presented here are typically percentage changes in the endogenous variables relative to this 
unchanging equilibrium (unless otherwise specified). All of the effects reported are therefore directly 
attributable to the exogenous shocks. Given that the CGE model uses annual data, we take each period 
in the adjustment process to be one year.  
To observe the adjustment of all the economic variables through time, simulations are run for 50 
periods (years). Results for a range of economic and energy use are reported. The focus is primarily on 
the long run, over which capital stocks are fully adjusted.  
 
 
 
Table 1 reports the results of the stimulus to government expenditure. The aggregate results are 
significantly impacted by the assumed behaviour of wages, in line with our discussion of Figure 1 
in Section 2; the qualitative results confirm the ex-ante analysis with the employment effects ranked 
FNW/FRW > BRW > ELS, with the ranking reversed for real wage changes. 
So, under fixed wage closures, there is no crowding out from the supply side in the long-run: there are 
no changes in (real or nominal) wages or prices. This implies that there are no changes in exports. This 
model closure behaves like a traditional Keynesian demand-driven model, in which fix-price multipliers 
operate. In fact, inputs within each sector adjust equi-proportional and the system operates as if it were 
an extended input-output system (McGregor et al, 1996). This means that together with the direct 
expansion in production from the increase in government expenditure there is accompanying indirect 
and induced activity generated by additional consumption, investment and intermediate demand.   
Accordingly, between all the labour market closures, the expansion in GDP and employment is greatest 
in this case. The increase in GDP (1.76%) is nearly three times the scale of that under regional bargaining 
(BRW), and employment increases by 2.01%. Although exports are unchanged (reflecting unchanged 
competitiveness), imports are stimulated by the increase in economic activity. Household consumption 
increases by 1.32% and investment by 1.36%. 
Energy use and CO2 emissions rise due to the big increase in economic activity. This is particularly 
marked in energy use in production which increases by 1.32% as opposed to energy use in final 
demands (0.79%). However, energy and emissions intensities both fall; the stimulus to activity exceeds 
that to energy use. This is because UK government expenditure itself is not very energy intensive (see 
Appendix A for a sector breakdown of energy intensities) so that economic activity is stimulated without 
increasing energy use significantly. 
Under BRW, the stimulus to demand also increases GDP and employment but by significantly less than 
under the fixed wage closures, in line with our ex-ante analysis. This reflects the fact that to induce 
further labour input firms need to bid up the real wage, which results in a rise in wages and prices, a 
loss of competitiveness and a fall in exports (of 1.40%). Consumption rises by only 1.02% and 
investment by 0.26%. This crowding out effect ensures a smaller expansion than under FNW/FRW.  
The crowding out of some private sector expenditures and exports is reflected in a much smaller rise in 
total energy use in this case as compared to the fix-wage case ( 0.32% as compared to 1.14% under 
FRW) , but total emissions actually fall slightly (by 0.7%) in response to a change in sectoral mix and 
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type of fuel use19. Energy and emissions intensities both fall. As expected, Under ELS the real wage rises, 
by 1.54%, in response to the stimulus to demand to re-equilibrate demand for labour with the fixed 
supply. GDP actually falls in this case; the private sector activity that is crowded out here is more value-
added intensive than the public sector.  
There is, depending on the model closure, some crowding out of exports. However, imports rise across 
all models, so that emissions are shifted abroad (and these emissions are not accounted for in our 
industrial territorial emissions). 
Total energy use falls: government expenditure, which is has low energy intensity, displaces private 
expenditure (which has high energy intensity). While household consumption and energy use increases, 
total final demand use increases only very slightly (due to a fall in investment, and displacement from 
the proportionately large displacement of exports), and this is more than offset by the reduction in 
energy use in production. Changes in energy investment reflect the capital intensity of the composition 
of output. 
Overall, Government expenditure is intrinsically low-energy using, so the overall impact on total energy 
use becomes critically dependent on the scale of any stimulus to/ contraction in private sector activity 
that is induced by the increase in public spending. Accordingly, where there is complete crowding out 
(under ELS), energy use falls; where there is no crowding out (FNW/FRW) energy use rises (since no 
part of the private sector is adversely impacted and the public sector expands). In intermediate cases 
it depends on the strength of the supply side constraint: here with BRW, overall there is an increase in 
energy use, but emissions actually fall due to the composition of energy use. The fall in CO2 emissions 
is, however, at least in part due to shifting emissions abroad. 
 
 
 
Table 2 summarises the long-run impact of a 5% rise in the average tax rate that goes towards reducing 
the Governments debt. The qualitative results vary significantly across different labour market 
closures, and confirm the discussion of Figure 2 given in Section 2. In this case, both demand and (where 
applicable) supply-side pressures are contractionary, always generating a non-positive change in 
employment and economic activity. In particular, employment changes are ranked: ELS > FNW/FRWpre 
> BRW > FRWpt, where the latter closure assumes that it is the post-tax real wage that is fixed (and 
FRW fixes the pre-tax real wage).  
Considering first the impacts under models in which the pre-tax real wage is fixed. Here, there is simply 
a contractionary demand effect, which operates through the impact of tax on disposable household 
incomes and wealth. For, while gross wages are unaffected, after tax wages fall significantly, reducing 
households labour income and wealth, inducing a reduction in consumption demand. There is no 
adverse supply impact in this case, and neither the wage rate, nor the CPI, nor competitiveness (and 
therefore exports) are adversely impacted. 
The big fall in household consumption (of 2.67%), reduces intermediate demand and investment too 
(by 1.53%). Neither government spending nor exports are impacted. This results in a 1.39% reduction 
                                                          
19 Whilst total energy use and individual fuel use rise, there is a shift in the fuel-mix consumed at individual secretors. This 
shift entails a fall in emissions from oil (and coal) to fall, whilst these from gas rise. The fall in oil emissions is sufficient here 
to counter the rise in gas emissions for total industrial territorial CO2 emissions to fall. 
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in GDP and a 1.30% fall in employment. This decline in economic activity and final demands reduces 
energy use in both production and final demands, with an accompanying fall in emissions and the 
energy and emissions intensities. 
The BRW case has a much greater negative impact than the FRWpre (fixed pre-tax real wage). This 
reflects the fact that workers seek to restore their post-tax real wage, and this puts upward pressure 
on real and nominal post tax wages and prices, despite the contraction in demand. In this case the CPI 
actually increases, inducing a loss of competitiveness and a reduction in exports, which reinforces the 
downward pressures on consumption and especially investment demands. So here GDP and 
employment fall by significantly more than under fixed wage cases  by 2.48% and 2.43% respectively. 
Not surprisingly therefore, energy use in production and final demand contract significantly, as do 
emissions; but while emissions intensity falls, energy intensity actually increases (as GDP falls by more 
than total energy use).  
Notice that under the BRW closure the post-tax real wage actually falls by 2.2%; while labour seeks to 
restore its real wage, the downward pressure on wages from the reduction in demand prevents it from 
doing so. However, if workers were in a position to ensure the restoration of their real post-tax wage, 
the results reported in the first column of Table 2 would be generated. Of course, here the 
contractionary impact on the economy is greatest, as we would expect from our ex-ante analysis 
in Section 2. There is a greater loss of competitiveness and of export demand and the contraction in 
GDP and employment is significantly greater.  
Under the ELS closure, the reduction in demand has no impact on employment: the real wage falls to 
re-equate labour demand with the exogenous supply of labour. So here even the pre-tax real wage falls 
(by 0.96%), and the post-tax wage falls by much more (4.0%). Of course, this moderates the scale of 
the contraction and prevents any fall in employment; ultimately the induced reduction in the CPI and 
the gain in competitiveness and exports compensates for the fall in consumption and investment. GDP 
falls by significantly less than under the other closures. Accordingly, energy use in production and final 
demand fall by less too, as do territorial emissions. 
As such, a rise in taxation always adversely impacts household consumption demands by reducing 
disposable income and wealth. Under the FNW/ FRWpre closure this is the only effect, since there is 
no adverse supply effect in this case arising through labours attempt to restore its real post-tax wage. 
In this fixed wage case there is a contraction in consumption, which does induce a further contraction 
in investment, but exports are not impacted. GDP falls as do energy use and emissions.  
Matters are more complex when the supply-side becomes relevant. First, if bargaining is over the post-
tax wage, as under BRW, there is an adverse supply-side impact accompanying the contraction in labour 
demand, as workers put upward pressure on wages in an attempt to restore their after-tax wage. If 
they were completely successful in doing this, the result is the maximum contraction in GDP and 
employment and in energy use and emissions. 
Second, if labour market pressures impact wages  as they must under ELS so as to maintain the same 
equilibrium level of employment  wages tend to fall, and this moderates the scale of any contraction 
so as to prevent any reduction in employment. In our particular case GDP and energy use fall slightly, 
but this reflects sectoral compositional changes.  
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Of course, if we were to reverse the tax changes all the signs would change and there would be 
increases in GDP, employment, energy and emissions use and intensities, which would be greatest if 
workers retain their real post-tax wage. So when tax is used to stimulate the economy, the impact on 
the environment is adverse  which contrasts somewhat with the impact when government spending 
is used. We next explore this differential energy impact of public spending and taxation when viewed 
as alternative policy instruments for achieving the same economic goal. 
 
 
 
It is clear from the simulations that taxation and public spending have differential impacts on both 
economic and energy policy goals. This is highlighted if we compare the energy implications of achieving 
a given GDP target through a reduction in income tax as against an expansion in public spending. Table 
3 summarises the results for a 0.6% rise in GDP. The results of achieving this through an expansion in 
government spending are shown for the BRW closure (although the qualitative results are broadly 
similar across other closures). This requires an increase in 5.08% for government expenditure (similar 
in scale to the stimulus used to generate the results reported in Table 1) or a much smaller (1.34%) 
reduction in income tax. Total energy use is increased by 0.32% as a consequence of increased public 
spending, but by 0.57% if the expansion is achieved through lower taxation. With reduced taxation 
there is a relatively greater stimulus to private, as compared to UK public, spending and the former is 
more energy and emissions intensive. The link between economic activity and total energy use and 
emissions is much stronger in response to tax reductions than to expenditure increases. Indeed 
emissions actually fall slightly in the public-spending-induced expansion. It would appear that for any 
given fiscal stimulus, any adverse energy and emissions impacts would be limited by stimulating 
government spending rather than reducing taxation. 
 
:  
 
Here we consider the impact of a balanced-budget fiscal expansion  a rise in taxation matched by a 
rise in government spending. In all cases there is a stimulus to demand since government expenditure 
is increasing and substituting for private consumption, and the former has a lower propensity to import. 
The general equilibrium labour demand curve will exhibit a net outward shift, with an increase in labour 
demand at initial pre-tax real wage. The employment (and GDP) impacts of the results are ranked across 
the various labour market closures exactly as the discussion of Figure 3 suggests: FRW/FNWpre > SOCW 
> ELS > BRW > FRWpt. 
Consider first the results under the simple Keynesian model with a fixed nominal (or pre-tax real) wage 
that are reported in column 1 of Table 4. Here the 5% increase in the income tax rate ultimately 
generates a 5.25% increase in government spending, so the results closely approximate simultaneous 
implementation of the government expenditure and taxation changes reported in Tables 1 and 2 
respectively. In this case, there is a net stimulus to demand together with no adverse supply side impact, 
so that GDP and employment increasing by 0.43% and 0.78% respectively, where the order of 
magnitude is as expected given the results of Tables 1 and 2. 
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We know that under FRWpre the increase in public spending when applied alone increases economic 
activity and emissions, the latter reflecting the induced expansion in consumption and investment. On 
the other hand, the increase in the tax rate alone reduces activity and emissions. However, the relative 
reduction in economic activity from the tax increase is less than the increase though public spending, 
whilst the reduction in emissions is more. There is therefore a net increase in GDP and fall in emissions. 
Under a balanced budget FRWpre, consumption still falls as the post-tax wage rate falls but this is partly 
offset by the net contribution to the household budget brought about by the increase in employment. 
Household consumption falls by 1.3% with the balanced budget expansion therefore, as compared to 
2.7 % with the tax increase alone. Investment also falls, although again by much less than in Table 2. 
Total energy use actually falls (by 0.34%), as do emissions (by 0.39%), despite the overall expansion in 
economic activity. This reflects the low energy (and emissions) intensity of government spending 
relative to that of private spending which is adversely impacted by the rise in income tax. Both energy 
and emissions intensities fall. 
Note that, in these circumstances, a balanced budget fiscal expansion simultaneously improves the 
economy while reducing energy use and emissions (and intensities). There is an apparent double 
dividend as key government economic and energy policy goals are simultaneously improved.  
Under BRW, however, there is an adverse supply effect which here dominates the net stimulus to 
demand, so that there is a significant contraction in GDP of 2.2% and employment of 2%. The wage rise 
leads to larger falls in wealth and consumption because of the contraction in employment. In this case 
there is also an even greater proportionate fall in investment than in the fix-wage cases. There are big 
reductions in energy use (2.1%) and emissions (2.4%), but not in intensity. Under these circumstances 
the balanced budget fiscal expansion therefore has a contractionary impact on the economy, which 
moderates energy use and emissions. Under BRW there seems no prospect of a double dividend, and 
indeed even the primary objective of the fiscal expansion is not achieved. 
Matters are, of course, even worse if workers succeed in defending their post-tax real wage in the face 
of the fiscal changes. Here there is an even greater contraction in economic activity and reduction in 
energy use and emissions. 
What if workers were to value the increased spending at the margin as much as their loss of after tax 
income and this was fully reflected in their bargaining behaviour? Under this Social Wage (SOCW) 
case workers would accept a fall in their post-tax wage because they value the increase in government 
expenditure and feel no worse off after the change (e.g. Lecca et al., (2014b). Accordingly, bargaining 
would effectively focus on the pre-tax real wage. 
The impact of the balanced budget fiscal expansion in this case are summarised in the second column 
of Table 3. In this case, as expected given our ex-ante analysis, employment actually increases: the 
adverse supply impact of the fiscal expansion is nullified and only the demand stimulus is present. 
However, the stimulus to activity puts upward pressure on the pre-tax real wage, and the expansion is 
significantly less than under the fix-wage closures. Indeed, in this case GDP actually falls slightly, 
reflecting the change in the balance of economic activity between the private and public sectors. Total 
energy use and emissions, and their intensities, fall. So in the Social Wage case there is a double 
dividend in terms of employment and emissions, both of which simultaneously move favourably; 
however the dividend does not here extend to GDP. 
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Under ELS even pre-tax wages would have to rise to ensure that labour demand again equals the fixed 
labour supply, although post-tax wage rates fall. Here again GDP actually declines, though by much less 
than under BRW. Again, there is a compositional effect that lowers GDP, although employment, of 
course, is unchanging. Total energy use and emissions fall by more than under fix-wage cases. Of course, 
there is no double dividend in this case since economic activity (excepting employment) falls as do 
emissions. 
Overall, the results across the different labour market models illustrate a number of potential trade-
offs. First, there are two labour market models, FNW and FRWpre, where an increase in economic 
activity and employment can be observed along with a fall in total energy use and emissions. This would 
suggest that a double dividend is possible in a situation where workers are willing to accept cuts in their 
post-tax wage. Second, in the case where workers value public spending, SOC, a fall in economic activity 
can be observed along with a fall in total energy use and emissions. Here, however, employment 
increases. Third, there are three labour market models, ELS, BRW, and FRWpt, where economic activity 
falls along with total energy use and emissions.   
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1: Long-run effects of a 5% increase in government spending. % changes from base year. 
  FNW/FRW BRW ELS 
GDP 1.76 0.59 -0.18 
CPI 0.00 0.80 1.34 
        
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -1.89 -0.75 0.00 
Total employment 2.01 0.80 0.00 
Nominal gross wage 0.00 1.73 2.90 
Real gross wage 0.00 0.92 1.54 
        
Households wealth 1.30 0.99 0.80 
Households consumption 1.32 1.02 0.82 
Labour income 2.01 2.54 2.90 
Capital income 1.36 1.01 0.78 
        
Government budget 10.26 15.28 18.63 
Government consumption 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Investment 1.36 0.26 -0.47 
        
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 1.14 0.32 -0.22 
  - Electricity 1.40 0.60 0.08 
  - Gas 1.34 0.70 0.28 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 1.32 0.34 -0.30 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 0.79 0.32 0.02 
  - Households 1.30 1.17 1.10 
  - Investment 1.30 0.26 -0.43 
  - Government 5.00 5.00 5.00 
  - Exports 0.00 -0.91 -1.51 
Energy output prices 0.00 0.54 0.89 
        
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) -0.61 -0.27 -0.04 
Territorial  CO2 emissions 1.04 -0.07 -0.79 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.71 -0.65 -0.62 
        
Total imports 1.49 2.21 2.70 
Total exports 0.00 -1.40 -2.31 
 
: Capital stocks are fixed in the short run at industry level. In the long run capital stocks fully adjust, across all sectors, to the shock, and 
are again equal to their desired levels. The short-run applies to a period of a year; the adjustment period to the long-run varies but is typically 
complete within 7-15 years. See Appendix B for short-run results. 
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: Long-run effects of a 5% increase in the income tax rate (FIXGOV). % changes from base year. 
  Long-run 
  
FRWpt BRW 
FNW/ 
FRWpre 
ELS 
GDP -5.17 -2.48 -1.39 -0.13 
CPI 2.69 0.76 0.00 -0.86 
          
Unemployment rate (pp difference) 4.90 2.28 1.23 0.00 
Total employment -5.21 -2.43 -1.30 0.00 
Nominal wage 5.94 1.64 0.00 -1.82 
Nominal wage after tax 2.69 -1.48 -3.07 -4.83 
Real wage 3.17 0.88 0.00 -0.96 
Real wage after tax 0.00 -2.22 -3.07 -4.00 
          
Households wealth -1.89 -1.20 -0.92 -0.57 
Households consumption -3.62 -2.95 -2.67 -2.33 
Labour income 0.43 -0.82 -1.30 -1.82 
Capital income -2.71 -1.87 -1.53 -1.14 
          
Government budget 5.64 -6.04 -10.56 -15.83 
Government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investment -5.09 -2.56 -1.53 -0.34 
          
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -4.15 -2.27 -1.51 -0.61 
  - Electricity -4.29 -2.48 -1.74 -0.88 
  - Gas -3.88 -2.41 -1.82 -1.11 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) -4.66 -2.42 -1.51 -0.45 
Energy consumption (total final demand) -2.94 -1.88 -1.44 -0.92 
  - Households -2.88 -2.62 -2.50 -2.35 
  - Investment -4.97 -2.58 -1.61 -0.47 
  - Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  - Exports -2.98 -0.86 0.00 1.01 
Energy output prices 1.78 0.50 0.00 -0.58 
Energy output -4.70 -2.41 -1.47 -0.38 
Non energy output -4.75 -2.35 -1.38 -0.25 
          
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 1.07 0.21 -0.11 -0.48 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -5.02 -2.49 -1.45 -0.24 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) 0.15 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 
          
Total imports 0.67 -1.02 -1.67 -2.40 
Total exports -4.55 -1.32 0.00 1.54 
 
: See Appendix C for short-run results. 
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: Long-run effects of a 5.08% increase in government spending, and a 1.34% reduction in the 
income tax rate, BRW closure. % changes from base year. 
  
Increase in 
government 
expenditure 
Reduction in 
income tax 
GDP (calibrated) 0.60 0.60 
CPI 0.81 -0.15 
      
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -0.76 -0.55 
Total employment 0.81 0.58 
Nominal wage 1.75 -0.32 
Nominal wage after tax 1.75 0.50 
Real wage 0.93 -0.17 
Real wage after tax 0.93 0.65 
      
Households wealth 1.01 0.31 
Households consumption 1.04 0.79 
Labour income 2.58 0.26 
Capital income 1.03 0.49 
      
Government budget 15.54 1.97 
Government consumption 5.08 0.00 
Income tax rate 0.00 -1.34 
Investment 0.26 0.63 
      
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 0.32 0.57 
  - Electricity 0.61 0.63 
  - Gas 0.71 0.62 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 0.34 0.60 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 0.33 0.48 
  - Households 1.19 0.71 
  - Investment 0.26 0.64 
  - Government 5.08 0.00 
  - Exports -0.93 0.17 
Energy output prices 0.54 -0.10 
Energy output 0.08 0.59 
Non energy output 0.68 0.57 
      
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) -0.27 -0.03 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -0.07 0.61 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.67 0.01 
      
Total imports 2.25 0.33 
Total exports -1.42 0.26 
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4: Long-run effects of a 5% increase in the income tax rate under a balanced budget (FIXBAL). % 
changes from base year. 
  Long-run 
  
FNW/ 
FRWpre 
SOCW ELS BRW FRWpt 
GDP 0.43 -0.09 -0.29 -2.20 -6.09 
CPI 0.00 0.21 0.29 1.06 2.69 
            
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -0.73 -0.21 0.00 1.93 5.88 
Total employment 0.78 0.22 0.00 -2.06 -6.26 
Nominal wage 0.00 0.45 0.62 2.29 5.94 
Nominal wage after tax -3.07 -2.64 -2.47 -0.85 2.69 
Real wage 0.00 0.24 0.33 1.22 3.17 
Real wage after tax -3.07 -2.84 -2.75 -1.89 0.00 
            
Households wealth 0.42 0.18 0.09 -0.79 -2.59 
Households consumption -1.34 -1.57 -1.67 -2.54 -4.31 
Labour income 0.78 0.67 0.62 0.19 -0.69 
Capital income -0.14 -0.39 -0.49 -1.45 -3.43 
            
Government budget 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Government consumption 5.25 4.62 4.38 2.05 -2.70 
Investment -0.14 -0.59 -0.76 -2.42 -5.80 
            
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -0.34 -0.69 -0.83 -2.12 -4.75 
  - Electricity -0.32 -0.69 -0.84 -2.21 -5.02 
  - Gas -0.44 -0.77 -0.90 -2.11 -4.58 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) -0.16 -0.58 -0.74 -2.25 -5.35 
Energy consumption (total final demand) -0.64 -0.85 -0.94 -1.73 -3.35 
  - Households -1.19 -1.38 -1.45 -2.15 -3.56 
  - Investment -0.27 -0.70 -0.87 -2.44 -5.65 
  - Government 5.25 4.62 4.38 2.05 -2.70 
  - Exports 0.00 -0.24 -0.33 -1.20 -2.98 
Energy output prices 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.70 1.78 
Energy output -0.36 -0.75 -0.90 -2.34 -5.26 
Non energy output 0.39 -0.09 -0.28 -2.04 -5.65 
            
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) -0.76 -0.60 -0.53 0.08 1.42 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -0.39 -0.80 -0.96 -2.48 -5.56 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.82 -0.71 -0.67 -0.29 0.55 
            
Total imports -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 
Total exports 0.00 -0.36 -0.51 -1.83 -4.55 
 
: See Appendix D for short-run results.  
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We explore the impact of increasing openness of the economy to trade by increasing Armington trade 
elasticities. This increases the sensitivity of the UK economy to changes in competitiveness. Results are 
summarised in Table 5 detailing the long-run results for Armington trade elasticities of 1.00, 1.50, 2.00, 
2.50, and 3.00, where 2.00 is the central estimate used in the UK-ENVI model and in the simulations 
reported earlier. This analysis re-runs the balanced-budget fiscal expansion under alternative values of 
the Armington trade elasticities. As the degree of substitutability is increased from 1.00 to 3.00 the 
system becomes more sensitive to competitiveness changes. The higher the elasticity, the greater the 
responsiveness to the adverse competitiveness effects due to the increase in prices arising from the 
increase in the income tax rate. The scale of the adverse effects increases along with increases in the 
Armington trade elasticity. That is, domestic goods become more competitive both in home and foreign 
markets, the higher the elasticity. In this case there is less demand for domestic goods there is a smaller 
stimulus to output, and stimulated demand for labour, the higher the Armington elasticity. Overall, 
there is a smaller stimulus seen from an increase in the income tax rate when the Armington trade 
elasticity is increased. These results emphasise that the degree of openness of the UK economy to trade 
flows is significantly important in influencing the overall results. 
 
: Armington sensitivity analysis. Long-run effects of a 5% increase in the income tax rate under 
a balanced budget (FIXBAL), BRW closure. % changes from base year. 
  ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? 
GDP -1.92 -2.07 -2.20 -2.31 -2.41 
CPI 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.99 0.93 
            
Total employment -1.81 -1.94 -2.06 -2.16 -2.25 
Nominal wage 2.68 2.47 2.29 2.13 2.01 
Nominal wage after tax -0.47 -0.68 -0.85 -1.00 -1.13 
Real wage 1.43 1.31 1.22 1.14 1.07 
Real wage after tax -1.69 -1.80 -1.89 -1.97 -2.04 
            
Government consumption 2.30 2.17 2.05 1.95 1.85 
Investment -2.09 -2.27 -2.42 -2.55 -2.67 
            
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -1.78 -1.96 -2.12 -2.25 -2.37 
Energy output prices 0.82 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.62 
            
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -2.17 -2.33 -2.48 -2.60 -2.71 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31 
            
Total imports 0.52 0.16 -0.15 -0.42 -0.65 
Total exports -1.07 -1.48 -1.83 -2.14 -2.41 
 
: See Appendix E for a full set of simulation results.  
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6   
 
The energy system and the economy are inextricably intertwined. While this interdependence is widely 
recognised, it has not featured prominently in assessing the likely impact of economic policies, notably 
industrial and fiscal policies: rather these assessments have tended to focus on the primary economic 
objectives of these policies, often the impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. 
In principle, fiscal policies are likely to have a significant influence on the energy system, the neglect of 
which may lead to inefficiencies in the design of appropriate energy and economic policies. The 
importance of this in practice depends on the strength of the spillover effects from fiscal policy 
instruments to the achievement of energy policy goals. This is the focus of the present paper. 
The multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach which we employ captures the 
interdependence of the economy and key elements of the energy systems and allows us to track the 
impact of key fiscal policy interventions on key goals of economic and energy policies.  
Our primary focus in this paper is on the impacts of fiscal policies on elements of the energy system 
and their effects on energy policy goals such as energy use and carbon emissions, and energy intensity. 
We start by considering the impacts of on key elements of the energy system of an increase in 
government spending in isolation, and then explore the impact of an increase in the average income 
tax rate. We then proceed by considering the implications of a balanced-budget rise in the income tax 
rate, where additional tax revenues are matched by a rise in government spending. 
Perhaps the most striking, but not surprising, result of our analysis is the crucial importance of the wage 
determination process in governing the impact of fiscal policy changes on both the economy and energy 
use and emissions. Given the widespread international evidence in favour of the wage curve we have 
generally adopted this as the default specification in our models. Since this implies that workers bargain 
over post-tax wages, any changes in income tax rates have supply-side impacts.  
In general, (money-financed) increases in government spending stimulate the economy. Overall, UK 
Government expenditure is intrinsically not very energy intensive, so the impact on total energy use 
becomes critically dependent on the scale of any stimulus to/contraction in private sector activity that 
is induced by the increase in public spending. Accordingly, where there is complete crowding out, 
energy use falls; where there is no crowding out (fix-wage cases), energy use rises, since no part of the 
private sector is adversely impacted and the public sector expands. In intermediate cases it depends on 
the strength of the supply-side constraint. In the presence of a bargained real wage function/ wage 
curve, overall there is an increase in energy use, but emissions actually fall slightly, offering some 
prospect of a double dividend of an increase in economic activity with a reduction in emissions. 
However, this result is the net outcome of countervailing effects on emissions and so is not guaranteed. 
While (money financed) income tax reductions also stimulate the economy, the outcomes results again 
depend on the precise nature of wage determination. However, typically there is a stimulus to the 
economy and a broadly similar increase in both total energy use and in emissions. The link between 
movements in economic activity and energy use and emissions is noticeably stronger for tax cuts than 
for public spending increases. This reflects the fact that tax cuts operate through the expansion of 
disposable income and wealth, stimulating consumption and other private sector spending, which 
tends to be energy and emissions intensive relative to current public spending.  
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In the context of general balanced budget expansions there are countervailing demand and supply side 
influences. Aggregate demand is stimulated since government expenditure is less import intensive than 
private spending. However, the increase in taxation puts upward pressure on wages IF workers seek to 
restore their post-tax wage. In the default version of our model the latter adverse supply effect 
dominates and economic activity declines. This is associated with a reduction in energy use (though an 
increase in energy intensity) and in emissions (whose intensity falls). The adverse economic impact is 
associated with a beneficial impact on emissions. Similarly, a balanced budget fiscal contraction would 
be associated with a simultaneous expansion of economic activity and energy use and emissions; again 
there would appear to be a trade-off between economic and emissions objectives. 
Is the trade-off inevitable? It does depend, inter alia, on whether workers value public spending and 
their willingness to accept cuts in their post-tax wage. Under a Social Wage arrangement, workers 
would effectively bargain for a pre-tax wage in return for some augmentation of public services. In 
these circumstances the adverse supply effect of an increase in taxes is mitigated, and our results 
suggest it is then possible to obtain a simultaneous stimulus to economic activity and reduction in 
emissions, though again this result is not inevitable. If the recent past experience of the comparative 
constancy of pre-tax real wages were to continue, the supply side impact of the tax rise would be 
nullified, and economic expansion would result, with the possibility of an accompanying reduction in 
emissions.  
Overall, our results suggest that a double dividend - a simultaneous stimulus to the economy and a 
reduction in emissions  induced by an increase in current public spending or a hike in the income tax 
rate seem unlikely in the UK context. However, if workers accept the shift from both emission and 
import intensive consumption to public sector output, economic activity can rise, emissions fall and 
imports fall too. Nonetheless, there are undoubted differential spillover effects on key elements of the 
energy system from tax and public spending policies that may prove capable of being exploited through 
the coordination of fiscal and energy policies. Even if it seems unlikely that fiscal policies would be 
adjusted with a view to improved coordination with energy policies, the latter should at least be aware 
of likely direction and scale of fiscal spillover effects to the energy system. 
Future research will relax the rather restrictive assumptions about macroeconomic closure employed 
here, notably the assumption that interest rates are fixed, and the absence of deficit and balance of 
payments constraints. However, these simplifications serve the important purpose in the current paper 
of allowing a clear focus on the direct spillovers from key fiscal policy instruments to key elements of 
the energy system. Future research will also: relax the assumption that current government 
consumption has no supply side impact effects (e.g. through human capital investment); analyse the 
spillover effects arising from a wider range of taxes, and explore the possibility of the social wage case 
being linked to the composition of government spending. 
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: Sector characteristics by income and expenditure components, 2010 UK Social Accounting Matrix 
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1.AGR Agriculture, forestry & fishing   47 3 17 31 -9 14   54 32 0 4 0 10 
2. MIN Mining & quarrying   47 17 28 7 5 13   97 30 0 0 -36 8 
3. CRU Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas & Metal Ores + coal   26 12 7 61 1 5   46 4 0 1 -1 49 
4. OMI Other Mining & mining services   33 9 17 36 2 11   54 7 1 1 0 37 
5. FOO Food (+ Tobacco)   57 3 23 5 1 15   50 35 1 0 0 14 
6. DRI Drink   57 4 17 15 2 8   50 22 0 0 1 27 
7. TEX Textile, Leather & Wood   35 2 28 10 1 26   55 13 1 4 0 28 
8. PAP Paper & Printing   37 5 28 11 2 23   70 15 1 3 0 10 
9. COK Coke & refined petroleum products              21 15 10 3 5 62   34 25 0 0 0 41 
10. CHE Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals   34 3 17 17 1 30   28 3 0 1 0 68 
11. RUB Rubber, Cement, + Glass   37 6 28 7 2 26   73 2 0 1 1 24 
12. IRO Iron, steel + metal   37 3 27 6 2 29   64 2 0 5 3 26 
13. ELM Electrical Manufacturing   40 2 30 10 1 20   36 4 0 11 1 48 
14. MOT Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers & Semi-Trailers     53 1 18 5 1 23   24 13 0 2 1 60 
15. TRA Transport equipment + other Manufacturing (incl Repair)   47 2 27 7 1 18   40 8 1 9 0 43 
16. ELE Electricity, transmission & distribution   67 53 6 11 2 14   67 30 1 1 0 2 
17. GAS Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; steam & air conditioning      57 45 10 12 3 18   56 44 0 0 0 0 
18. WTR Natural water treatment & supply services; sewerage services   29 4 20 43 5 2   31 69 0 0 0 0 
19.WAM Water Management & remediation   50 1 21 16 6 7   38 13 25 2 0 22 
20. CON Construction - Buildings   49 1 22 19 3 7   47 1 0 52 -1 1 
21.WHO Wholesale & Retail Trade   39 2 35 15 4 7   24 57 1 3 0 16 
22. TRL Land Transport   43 3 35 12 2 8   53 40 1 1 0 4 
23. TRO Other transport   46 2 23 9 3 19   12 53 0 0 0 34 
24. TRS Transport support   52 1 33 7 3 5   86 4 1 0 0 9 
25. ACC Accommodation & Food Service Activities   35 1 32 12 8 13   13 72 1 2 0 12 
26. COM Communication   32 1 35 20 2 12   50 25 2 11 0 12 
27. SER Services   35 1 23 33 2 6   45 37 0 3 0 16 
28. EDU Education health & defence   29 1 49 6 5 11   16 14 68 1 0 1 
29. REC Recreational   35 1 28 24 5 8   28 50 5 4 0 14 
30. OTR Other private services   22 1 47 21 4 6   37 43 4 8 0 8 
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B: Short- and long-run effects of a 5% increase in government spending. In % changes from base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  FNW/FRW BRW ELS   FNW FRW BRW ELS 
GDP 1.76 0.59 -0.18   0.98 0.77 0.46 -0.01 
CPI 0.00 0.80 1.34   0.58 0.69 0.96 1.28 
                  
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -1.89 -0.75 0.00   -1.52 -1.18 -0.71 0.00 
Total employment 2.01 0.80 0.00   1.61 1.26 0.76 0.00 
Nominal gross wage 0.00 1.73 2.90   0.00 0.69 1.84 3.48 
Real gross wage 0.00 0.92 1.54   -0.58 0.00 0.87 2.17 
                  
Households wealth 1.30 0.99 0.80   0.84 0.89 0.99 1.13 
Households consumption 1.32 1.02 0.82   0.84 0.74 0.88 0.86 
Labour income 2.01 2.54 2.90   1.61 1.96 2.62 3.48 
Capital income 1.36 1.01 0.78   2.71 2.18 1.57 0.53 
                  
Government budget 10.26 15.28 18.63   16.56 17.39 18.77 20.72 
Government consumption 5.00 5.00 5.00   5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Investment 1.36 0.26 -0.47   2.19 1.65 0.71 -0.55 
                  
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 1.14 0.32 -0.22   0.75 0.59 0.44 0.14 
  - Electricity 1.40 0.60 0.08   1.13 0.92 0.73 0.35 
  - Gas 1.34 0.70 0.28   0.80 0.69 0.66 0.51 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 1.32 0.34 -0.30   0.65 0.50 0.34 0.05 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 0.79 0.32 0.02   0.42 0.37 0.45 0.45 
  - Households 1.30 1.17 1.10   0.91 0.86 1.09 1.19 
  - Investment 1.30 0.26 -0.43   1.69 1.26 0.73 -0.14 
  - Government 5.00 5.00 5.00   5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
  - Exports 0.00 -0.91 -1.51   -0.39 -0.41 -0.52 -0.61 
Energy output prices 0.00 0.54 0.89   0.29 0.33 0.45 0.59 
                  
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) -0.61 -0.27 -0.04   -0.23 -0.18 -0.02 0.15 
Territorial  CO2 emissions 1.04 -0.07 -0.79   0.29 0.16 0.03 -0.22 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.71 -0.65 -0.62   -0.69 -0.60 -0.43 -0.22 
                  
Total imports 1.49 2.21 2.70   2.20 2.20 2.46 2.65 
Total exports 0.00 -1.40 -2.31   -0.83 -1.00 -1.41 -1.90 
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: Short- and long-run effects of a 5% increase in the income tax rate (FIXGOV). In % changes from base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  
FRWpt BRW 
FNW 
/FRWpre 
ELS   FRWpt BRW FNW FRWpre ELS 
GDP -5.17 -2.48 -1.39 -0.13   -1.32 -0.85 -0.46 -0.19 0.00 
CPI 2.69 0.76 0.00 -0.86   0.12 -0.40 -0.71 -0.84 -1.05 
                      
Unemployment rate (pp difference) 4.90 2.28 1.23 0.00   2.00 1.29 0.70 0.30 0.00 
Total employment -5.21 -2.43 -1.30 0.00   -2.12 -1.37 -0.75 -0.31 0.00 
Nominal wage 5.94 1.64 0.00 -1.82   3.29 1.40 0.00 -0.84 -1.59 
Nominal wage after tax 2.69 -1.48 -3.07 -4.83   0.12 -1.72 -3.07 -3.89 -4.61 
Real wage 3.17 0.88 0.00 -0.96   3.17 1.80 0.71 0.00 -0.55 
Real wage after tax 0.00 -2.22 -3.07 -4.00   0.00 -1.32 -2.38 -3.07 -3.60 
                      
Households wealth -1.89 -1.20 -0.92 -0.57   0.03 -0.14 -0.25 -0.31 -0.37 
Households consumption -3.62 -2.95 -2.67 -2.33   -1.57 -2.02 -2.10 -1.99 -2.18 
Labour income 0.43 -0.82 -1.30 -1.82   1.10 0.00 -0.75 -1.15 -1.59 
Capital income -2.71 -1.87 -1.53 -1.14   -4.12 -3.36 -2.56 -1.92 -1.59 
                      
Government budget 5.64 -6.04 -10.56 -15.83   -11.53 -13.59 -15.08 -16.01 -16.86 
Government consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Investment -5.09 -2.56 -1.53 -0.34   -4.98 -3.39 -2.24 -1.57 -0.84 
                      
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -4.15 -2.27 -1.51 -0.61   -1.39 -1.23 -1.01 -0.80 -0.74 
  - Electricity -4.29 -2.48 -1.74 -0.88   -1.87 -1.65 -1.37 -1.11 -1.02 
  - Gas -3.88 -2.41 -1.82 -1.11   -1.10 -1.18 -1.11 -0.97 -1.00 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) -4.66 -2.42 -1.51 -0.45   -1.07 -0.86 -0.64 -0.45 -0.37 
Energy consumption (total final demand) -2.94 -1.88 -1.44 -0.92   -0.67 -0.91 -0.96 -0.90 -1.01 
  - Households -2.88 -2.62 -2.50 -2.35   -1.22 -1.83 -2.02 -1.97 -2.23 
  - Investment -4.97 -2.58 -1.61 -0.47   -3.66 -2.90 -2.19 -1.65 -1.33 
  - Government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  - Exports -2.98 -0.86 0.00 1.01   0.20 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.66 
Energy output prices 1.78 0.50 0.00 -0.58   -0.01 -0.25 -0.38 -0.44 -0.54 
Energy output -4.70 -2.41 -1.47 -0.38   -0.80 -0.68 -0.53 -0.40 -0.35 
Non energy output -4.75 -2.35 -1.38 -0.25   -1.36 -0.94 -0.58 -0.32 -0.15 
                      
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 1.07 0.21 -0.11 -0.48   -0.07 -0.38 -0.55 -0.61 -0.74 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -5.02 -2.49 -1.45 -0.24   -0.84 -0.67 -0.48 -0.32 -0.25 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) 0.15 -0.01 -0.06 -0.11   0.48 0.18 -0.02 -0.13 -0.25 
                      
Total imports 0.67 -1.02 -1.67 -2.40   -1.54 -2.14 -2.37 -2.37 -2.60 
Total exports -4.55 -1.32 0.00 1.54   -0.21 0.59 1.07 1.29 1.62 
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: Short- and long-run effects of a 5% increase in the income tax rate (FIXBAL). In % changes from base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  
FNW/ 
FRWpre 
SOCW ELS BRW FRWpt   FRWpre FNW SOCW ELS BRW FRWpt 
GDP 0.43 -0.09 -0.29 -2.20 -6.09   0.54 0.49 0.30 -0.01 -0.50 -0.92 
CPI 0.00 0.21 0.29 1.06 2.69   -0.15 -0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.12 0.07 
                          
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -0.73 -0.21 0.00 1.93 5.88   -0.84 -0.75 -0.46 0.00 0.75 1.37 
Total employment 0.78 0.22 0.00 -2.06 -6.26   0.89 0.80 0.49 0.00 -0.80 -1.46 
Nominal wage 0.00 0.45 0.62 2.29 5.94   -0.15 0.00 0.47 1.29 2.46 3.24 
Nominal wage after tax -3.07 -2.64 -2.47 -0.85 2.69   -3.22 -3.07 -2.62 -1.82 -0.68 0.07 
Real wage 0.00 0.24 0.33 1.22 3.17   0.00 0.13 0.55 1.26 2.34 3.17 
Real wage after tax -3.07 -2.84 -2.75 -1.89 0.00   -3.07 -2.94 -2.54 -1.85 -0.80 0.00 
                          
Households wealth 0.42 0.18 0.09 -0.79 -2.59   0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.45 
Households consumption -1.34 -1.57 -1.67 -2.54 -4.31   -1.22 -1.23 -1.34 -1.46 -1.79 -2.24 
Labour income 0.78 0.67 0.62 0.19 -0.69   0.74 0.80 0.96 1.29 1.64 1.73 
Capital income -0.14 -0.39 -0.49 -1.45 -3.43   0.19 0.06 -0.44 -1.17 -2.54 -3.89 
                          
Government budget 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Government consumption 5.25 4.62 4.38 2.05 -2.70   4.71 4.65 4.49 4.21 3.77 3.44 
Investment -0.14 -0.59 -0.76 -2.42 -5.80   0.14 0.02 -0.60 -1.32 -3.13 -5.23 
                          
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -0.34 -0.69 -0.83 -2.12 -4.75   -0.21 -0.25 -0.40 -0.62 -1.07 -1.56 
  - Electricity -0.32 -0.69 -0.84 -2.21 -5.02   -0.18 -0.23 -0.44 -0.72 -1.34 -2.04 
  - Gas -0.44 -0.77 -0.90 -2.11 -4.58   -0.28 -0.31 -0.42 -0.58 -0.90 -1.26 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) -0.16 -0.58 -0.74 -2.25 -5.35   0.04 0.00 -0.13 -0.33 -0.69 -1.02 
Energy consumption (total final demand) -0.64 -0.85 -0.94 -1.73 -3.35   -0.52 -0.53 -0.58 -0.63 -0.78 -0.99 
  - Households -1.19 -1.38 -1.45 -2.15 -3.56   -1.08 -1.09 -1.16 -1.23 -1.48 -1.87 
  - Investment -0.27 -0.70 -0.87 -2.44 -5.65   -0.34 -0.44 -0.88 -1.45 -2.71 -4.18 
  - Government 5.25 4.62 4.38 2.05 -2.70   4.71 4.65 4.49 4.21 3.77 3.44 
  - Exports 0.00 -0.24 -0.33 -1.20 -2.98   0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.28 
Energy output prices 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.70 1.78   -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
Energy output -0.36 -0.75 -0.90 -2.34 -5.26   -0.13 -0.16 -0.25 -0.39 -0.64 -0.87 
Non energy output 0.39 -0.09 -0.28 -2.04 -5.65   0.50 0.45 0.27 -0.03 -0.53 -0.97 
                          
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) -0.76 -0.60 -0.53 0.08 1.42   -0.75 -0.73 -0.70 -0.62 -0.57 -0.64 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -0.39 -0.80 -0.96 -2.48 -5.56   -0.15 -0.18 -0.28 -0.44 -0.71 -0.94 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.82 -0.71 -0.67 -0.29 0.55   -0.70 -0.67 -0.58 -0.44 -0.21 -0.02 
                          
Total imports -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16   -0.21 -0.22 -0.34 -0.42 -0.85 -1.55 
Total exports 0.00 -0.36 -0.51 -1.83 -4.55   0.26 0.23 0.15 -0.03 -0.18 -0.10 
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 Armington sensitivity analysis for a 5% increase in the income tax rate (FIXBAL). In % changes from base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ?   ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? ʍǀс ? ? ? ? 
GDP -1.92 -2.07 -2.20 -2.31 -2.41   -0.47 -0.49 -0.50 -0.52 -0.53 
CPI 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.99 0.93   0.29 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.01 
                        
Unemployment rate (pp difference) 1.70 1.83 1.93 2.03 2.12   0.70 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.79 
Total employment -1.81 -1.94 -2.06 -2.16 -2.25   -0.74 -0.78 -0.80 -0.82 -0.84 
Nominal wage 2.68 2.47 2.29 2.13 2.01   2.70 2.56 2.46 2.38 2.31 
Nominal wage after tax -0.47 -0.68 -0.85 -1.00 -1.13   -0.46 -0.59 -0.68 -0.76 -0.83 
Real wage 1.43 1.31 1.22 1.14 1.07   2.40 2.37 2.34 2.32 2.30 
Real wage after tax -1.69 -1.80 -1.89 -1.97 -2.04   -0.75 -0.78 -0.80 -0.82 -0.84 
                        
Households wealth -0.50 -0.66 -0.79 -0.91 -1.02   0.62 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.47 
Households consumption -2.23 -2.40 -2.54 -2.66 -2.77   -1.48 -1.64 -1.79 -1.92 -2.04 
Labour income 0.82 0.48 0.19 -0.07 -0.29   1.93 1.77 1.64 1.54 1.45 
Capital income -0.96 -1.22 -1.45 -1.65 -1.82   -2.18 -2.39 -2.54 -2.66 -2.75 
                        
Government consumption 2.30 2.17 2.05 1.95 1.85   3.75 3.76 3.77 3.78 3.78 
Investment -2.09 -2.27 -2.42 -2.55 -2.67   -2.70 -2.93 -3.13 -3.29 -3.43 
                        
Total energy use (intermediate+final) -1.78 -1.96 -2.12 -2.25 -2.37   -0.90 -0.99 -1.07 -1.13 -1.19 
  - Electricity -1.90 -2.07 -2.21 -2.33 -2.45   -1.10 -1.23 -1.34 -1.44 -1.53 
  - Gas -1.79 -1.96 -2.11 -2.24 -2.36   -0.70 -0.81 -0.90 -0.98 -1.06 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) -1.95 -2.11 -2.25 -2.38 -2.49   -0.57 -0.64 -0.69 -0.73 -0.77 
Energy consumption (total final demand) -1.33 -1.55 -1.73 -1.89 -2.04   -0.63 -0.71 -0.78 -0.84 -0.89 
  - Households -1.81 -1.99 -2.15 -2.29 -2.41   -1.14 -1.32 -1.48 -1.62 -1.75 
  - Investment -2.16 -2.31 -2.44 -2.55 -2.66   -2.35 -2.54 -2.71 -2.87 -3.01 
  - Government 2.30 2.17 2.05 1.95 1.85   3.75 3.76 3.77 3.78 3.78 
  - Exports -0.70 -0.97 -1.20 -1.40 -1.58   0.05 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.30 
Energy output prices 0.82 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.62   0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 
Energy output -2.04 -2.20 -2.34 -2.46 -2.57   -0.56 -0.60 -0.64 -0.67 -0.70 
Non energy output -1.73 -1.90 -2.04 -2.17 -2.29   -0.45 -0.50 -0.53 -0.56 -0.58 
                        
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04   -0.44 -0.51 -0.57 -0.62 -0.67 
Territorial  CO2 emissions -2.17 -2.33 -2.48 -2.60 -2.71   -0.65 -0.68 -0.71 -0.73 -0.76 
Emission intensity (territorial CO2/GDP) -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31   -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 
                        
Total imports 0.52 0.16 -0.15 -0.42 -0.65   -0.33 -0.62 -0.85 -1.03 -1.18 
Total exports -1.07 -1.48 -1.83 -2.14 -2.41   -0.24 -0.23 -0.18 -0.10 0.00 
33 
 
 
 
Adams, P. D., & Higgs, P. J. (1990). Calibration of computable general equilibrium models from 
synthetic benchmark equilibrium data sets. Economic Record, 66(2), 110-126. 
Allan, G., Hanley, N., McGregor, P., Swales, K., & Turner, K. (2007). The impact of increased efficiency 
in the industrial use of energy: a computable general equilibrium analysis for the United Kingdom. 
Energy Economics, 29(4), 779-798. 
Allan, G., Connolly K., McGregor, P., & Ross, A. G. (2018). Modelling economic-environmental linkages 
in a CGE model through sectoral physical use of energy. University of Strathclyde Department of 
Economics, Discussion Papers in Economics, 18(18). 
BEIS. (2017). Energy Consumption in the UK. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
London. Retrieved from Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. 
Cox, E., Royston, S., & Selby, J. (2016). Impact of Non-energy Policies on Energy Systems. Retrieved 
from UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC): http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/asset/1B9BBB2F-B98C-4250-
BEE5DE0F253EAD91/  
Bell, D. N., & Blanchflower, D. G. (2018). Underemployment and the Lack of Wage Pressure in the UK. 
National Institute Economic Review, 243(1), R53-R61. 
Bergman,L. (2005). CGE Modelling of Environmental Policy and Resource Management, chpt 24 in 
Mäler and Vincent (eds.) Handbook of Environmental Economics, Volume 3: Economy wide and 
International Environmental Issues. (Elsevier; north Holland.) 
Blanchflower, D.G. and Oswald, A.J., (2005). The wage curve reloaded (No. w11338). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Cui, C. X., Hanley, N., McGregor, P. G., Turner, K., Yaping, Y. &  J. K. Swales (2017) Impacts of Regional 
Productivity Growth, Decoupling and Carbon Leakage, Regional Studies, Vol. 51, 9, 1324-1335. 
Emonts-Holley, T., Ross, G.A. &  Swales, J.K. (2014), A Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland, Fraser 
of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, vol. 38(1), pp. 84-93. 
Figus, G., Turner, K., McGregor, P., & Katris, A. (2017). Making the case for supporting broad energy 
efficiency programmes: Impacts on household incomes and other economic benefits. Energy Policy, 
111, 157-165. 
Figus, G., Lecca, P., McGregor, P., & Turner, K. (2018). Energy efficiency as an instrument of regional 
development policy: the impact of regional fiscal autonomy. Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
Gupta, M. R., & Barman, T. R. (2009). Fiscal policies, environmental pollution and economic growth. 
Economic Modelling, 26(5), 1018-1028. 
Grossman, G. M., and Krueger, A. B. (1994) Economic growth and the environment. NBER Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper 4634. 
34 
 
,ĂůŬŽƐ ?' ? ? ? ?WĂŝǌĂŶŽƐ ? ?Ȱ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨ ĨŝƐĐĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶK ?ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ PǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
USA. Energy Policy, 88, 317-328. 
,ĂůŬŽƐ ?' ? ? ? ?WĂŝǌĂŶŽƐ ? ?Ȱ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨŐŽǀ ƌŶŵĞŶƚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞon the environment: An 
empirical investigation. Ecological Economics, 91, 48-56. 
HolmØy, E. and StrØm, B. (2013). Computable General Equilibrium Assessments of Fiscal Sustainability 
in Norway, chpt. 3, vol. IA, in Peter B. Dixon and Dale W. Jorgenson Handbook of Computable General 
Equilibrium Modeling (North-Holland, Oxford). 
Jaffe, A., Newell, R. and Stavins, R. (2003) Technological change and the environment. Handbook of 
Environmental Economics. (North-Holland). 
Lecca, P., McGregor, P. G., Swales, J. K., and Turner, K. (2014a). The added value from a general 
equilibrium analysis of increased efficiency in household energy use. Ecological Economics, 100, 51
62. 
Lecca, P., McGregor, P. G., Swales, J. K., & Yin, Y. P. (2014b). Balanced budget multipliers for small 
open regions within a federal system: evidence from the Scottish variable rate of income tax. Journal 
of Regional Science, 54(3), 402-421. 
Lopez, R., Galinato, G. I., & Islam, A. (2011). Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and 
empirics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(2), 180-198. 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2013  A Global Approach to Energy and the Environment: the G-Cubed 
Model, chpt. 15, vol. 1B, in Peter B. Dixon and Dale W. Jorgenson Handbook of Computable General 
Equilibrium Modeling (North-Holland, Oxford). 
ONS (2018a). Energy: use by industry, source and fuel. Office for National Statistics. Available 
from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/datasets/ukenvironmentalaccounts
energyusebyindustrysourceandfuel  
ONS (2018b). Atmospheric emissions: greenhouse gases. Office for National Statistics. Available 
from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/datasets/ukenvironmentalaccounts
atmosphericemissionsgreenhousegasemissionsbyeconomicsectorandgasunitedkingdom 
Partridge, M. D., & Rickman, D. S. (2010). Computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling for 
regional economic development analysis. Regional studies, 44(10), 1311-1328. 
Ross, A. G., Allan, G., Figus, G., McGregor, P. G., Roy, G., Swales, J. K., & Turner, K. (2018a). The 
economic impacts of UK trade-enhancing industrial policies and their spillover effects on the energy 
system. UK Energy Research Centre Working paper. 
Ross, A. G., Allan, G., Figus, G., McGregor, P. G., Roy, G., Swales, J. K., & Turner, K. (2018b). 
Highlighting the need for policy coordination: the economic impacts of UK trade-enhancing industrial 
policies and their spillover effects on the energy system. Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary, 
42(3), 53-67. 
Ross, A. G., Allan, G., Figus, G., McGregor, P. G., Roy, G., Swales, J. K., & Turner, K. (2018c). The 
economic impacts of UK labour productivity-enhancing industrial policies and their spillover effects on 
the energy system. Upcoming working paper in Economics. 
35 
 
UK Government. (2010). Greenhouse gas reporting  Conversion 2010. Retrieved 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/greenhouse-gas-reporting-conversion-factors-
2010  
Vollebergh, H., Melenberg, B. and Dijkgraaf, E. (2009). Identifying reduced-form relations with panel 
data: the case of pollution and income. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 
58, 27-42. 
Zhang, K., Wang, Q., Liang, Q. M., & Chen, H. (2016). A bibliometric analysis of research on carbon tax 
from 1989 to 2014. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 58, 297-310. 
